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Abstract
We consider the position of a member of a deﬁned contribution (DC) pension scheme having
the possibility of taking programmed withdrawals at retirement. According to this option, she
can defer annuitization of her fund to a propitious future time, that can be found to be optimal
according to some criteria. This option, that adds remarkable ﬂexibility in the choice of pension
beneﬁts, is not available in many countries, where immediate annuitization is compulsory at
retirement. In this paper, we address and try to answer the questions: “Is immediate annuiti-
zation optimal? If it is not, what is the cost to be paid by the retiree obliged to annuitize at
retirement?”. In order to do this, we consider the model by [7] and extend it in two diﬀerent
ways.
In the ﬁrst extension, we prove a theorem that provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for immediate annuitization being always optimal. The – not surprising – result is that com-
pulsory immediate annuitization turns out to be sub-optimal. We then quantify the extent of
sub-optimality, by deﬁning the sub-optimality cost as the loss of expected present value of con-
sumption from retirement to death and measuring it in many typical situations. We ﬁnd that
it varies in relative terms between 6% and 40%, depending on the risk aversion.
In the second extension, we make extensive numerical investigations of the model and seek the
optimal annuitization time. We ﬁnd that the optimal annuitization time depends on personal
factors such as the retiree’s risk aversion and her subjective perception of remaining lifetime.
It also depends on the ﬁnancial market, via the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset. Optimal
annuitization should occur a few years after retirement with high risk aversion, low Sharpe ratio
and/or short remaining lifetime, and many years after retirement with low risk aversion, high
Sharpe ratio and/or long remaining lifetime.
This paper supports the availability of programmed withdrawals as an option to retirees of DC
pension schemes, by giving an idea about the extent of loss in wealth suﬀered by a retiree who
cannot choose programmed withdrawals, but is obliged to annuitize immediately on retirement.
J.E.L. classiﬁcation: D91, G11, G23, J26.
Keywords: Deﬁned contribution pension scheme, decumulation phase, optimal annuitization
time, cost of sub-optimality.
1 Introduction
In deﬁned contribution (DC) pension schemes, the ﬁnancial risk is borne by the member: contri-
butions are ﬁxed in advance and the beneﬁts provided by the scheme depend on the investment
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1performance experienced during the active membership and on the price of the annuity at retire-
ment, in the case that the beneﬁts are given in the form of an annuity. Therefore, the ﬁnancial
risk can be split into two parts: investment risk, during the accumulation phase, and annuity risk,
focused at retirement. In order to limit the annuity risk – which is the risk that high annuity prices
(driven by low bond yields) at retirement can lead to a lower than expected pension income – in
many schemes the member has the possibility of deferring the annuitization of the accumulated
fund. This possibility consists of leaving the fund invested in ﬁnancial assets as in the accumu-
lation phase, and allows for periodic withdrawals by the pensioner, until annuitization occurs (if
ever). In UK this option is named “income drawdown option”, in US the periodic withdrawals
are called “phased withdrawals” or “programmed withdrawals”. There are a number of countries
where programmed withdrawals are an option to retirees of DC schemes. These include Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, El Salvador, Japan, Peru, UK, US. To the best of our
knowledge, there are even substantially more countries where this option is not available. These
include Austria, Bulgaria, Colombia, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland. An exhaustive recent survey
regarding the list of several forms of payment oﬀered by pension schemes can be found in [2].
A pensioner who takes the income drawdown option has three degrees of freedom:
1. she can decide what investment strategy to adopt in investing the fund at her disposal;
2. she can decide how much of the fund to withdraw at any time between retirement and ultimate
annuitization (if any);
3. she can decide when to annuitize (if ever).
The ﬁrst two choices represent a classical intertemporal decision making problem, which can be
dealt with using optimal control techniques in the typical Merton framework ([10]), whereas the
third choice can be tackled by deﬁning an optimal stopping time problem.
Examples of works dealing with these three choices via the formulation of a combined stochastic
control and optimal stopping problem are [7, 12, 14, 16].
Diﬀerently from the other mentioned papers, in [7] the authors solve the problem of optimal an-
nuitization in the presence of quadratic, target-depending loss functions. By so doing, they extend
[5] and [6], where the optimal couple investment-consumption is found in the presence of quadratic
loss function. The main novelty in the literature is that the optimal annuitization time depends on
the level of the wealth, that is linked to the stochastic evolution of the market returns.
In this paper, we extend [7] by addressing some of the issues left open.
From the theoretical point of view, we prove a theorem that provides necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for immediate annuitization being always optimal. A ﬁrst application of this theorem
shows the not surprising result that compulsory immediate annuitization is sub-optimal within this
model. We then quantify the extent of sub-optimality, by deﬁning the sub-optimality cost as the
loss of expected present value of consumption from retirement to death, and measuring it in many
typical situations. We ﬁnd that it varies in relative terms between 6% and 40%, depending on the
risk aversion.
From the applicative point of view, we carry out a broad sensitivity analysis of the model. The
main aim we have in mind is to provide a wide range of results regarding optimal annuitization
time and consequent size of annuity in most common situations.
2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the actuarial
literature on the decumulation phase of DC pension funds. Section 3 presents brieﬂy the model
exploited. In section 4 we prove the theorem that states the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for optimality of immediate annuitization and we interpret these conditions. The sub-optimality of
compulsory immediate annuitization comes as a consequence. In section 5 the practical implications
of the theorem are illustrated: in section 5.1 we present four typical scenarios which will be used
in the simulations and we check the condition of sub-optimality; in section 5.2 the cost of sub-
optimality is deﬁned and measured in those scenarios. Section 6 completes the analysis, by reporting
the results of the broad sensitivity analysis of the model, i.e. optimal annuitization time and other
related issues in the selected scenarios. Section 7 concludes.
2 Review of actuarial literature on decumulation phase
In the countries where the possibility of deferring ultimate annuitization is an option, the pensioner
who takes this option can decide what investment strategy to adopt in investing the fund at
her disposal, how much of the fund to withdraw at any time between retirement and ultimate
annuitization, and when to annuitize. The evidence that the option is actually taken by many
pensioners is in apparent contrast with [18] fundamental work, according to which retirees should
annuitize immediately at retirement. By addressing the three choices outlined above, the actuarial
literature tries also to extend Yaari’s Theorem and to give convincing explanations to the so-called
“annuity puzzle”. Whereas the income drawdown option adds ﬂexibility in the choices of the
pensioner, and gives her the hope of being able to buy later on a better annuity than the one
purchasable at retirement, the main drawback is that with self-annuitization the member bears the
longevity risk, i.e. the risk of outliving her own assets. Therefore, another relevant issue that arises
when the income drawdown option is chosen is the ruin probability, i.e. the probability that the
pensioner runs out of money when she is still alive.
A number of authors have dealt with the problem of managing the ﬁnancial resources of a pensioner
after retirement and have investigated the alternatives available to a retiree other than immediate
annuitization. All these papers approach some or all of the four important issues outlined above,
namely, investment and consumption strategies, optimal annuitization time, ruin probability. Pa-
pers that address mainly the ruin probability are, e.g., [1] and [13]. Papers that explore diﬀerent
investment strategies and/or diﬀerent consumption paths, possibly analyzing also the ruin issue
are, e.g., [4, 5, 6, 9, 17]. Papers that add to their analysis also investigations on the optimal
annuitization time are, e.g., [3, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16].
In this paper we focus on the optimal time of annuitization. It is then important to review brieﬂy
the other contributions to this relevant topic. In [8] and [11] the basic idea is that since the annuity
price is calculated with the riskfree rate, in the ﬁrst years after retirement the equity risk premium
pays more than the mortality credits (due to annuitants who die earlier than average); therefore
in the ﬁrst years after retirement the individual should invest and consume, and should annuitize
when the mortality credits become so large that it becomes worthwhile annuitize (“do-it-yourself-
and-then-switch” strategy). According to their simulations, in UK the maximum annuitization age
of 75 (which is even 10 years greater than NRA(1)) is at least 5 years too low, and a Canadian
female aged 65 has 90% probability of beating the interest rate return until the age of 80. In [3]
the authors ﬁnd that the optimal annuitization age is sensitive to the degree of risk aversion and
varies from NRA (for very high risk aversion) to 79–80 (for very low risk aversion). [5] and [6] ﬁnd
(1)NRA stands for “normal retirement age”.
3that income drawdown option has to be preferred to immediate annuitization when risk aversion
is not too high and the risky asset is suﬃciently good compared to the riskfree one. In [14] the
authors solve an optimization problem and ﬁnd optimal investment/consumption strategies and
optimal annuitization time using logarithmic utility function. They ﬁnd that optimal annuitization
age, which depends on the relative risk aversion and on the wealth status, is typically higher than
70. In [7] the authors solve a similar problem with quadratic loss functions. They ﬁnd that optimal
annuitization is mainly driven by risk proﬁle of the retiree, level of the fund and market conditions,
and in some typical situations should occur 6–7 years after retirement, but may occur also 10–15
years after it.
It is our opinion that the problem of ﬁnding optimal investment and consumption strategies and
optimal annuitization time should be rigorously formulated as a combined stochastic control and
optimal stopping problem. Up to our knowledge, in the literature this has been done only by
[7, 12, 14, 16]. While in [12] the authors minimize the probability of ﬁnancial ruin, in [16] the
author ﬁnds optimal choices in a very general expected utility setting, distinguishing between
utility pre-annuitization and utility post-annuitization and selecting as a special case the power
utility function, and in [14] the authors maximize expected utility of lifetime consumption and
bequest, with age-dependent force of mortality and power utility function. Diﬀerently from these
papers, in [7] the authors solve the problem of optimal investment and consumption strategies as
well as optimal annuitization time by selecting a quadratic loss function. We brieﬂy present their
model in the next section.
3 The model
A retiree has a lump sum of size x0 which can be invested either in a riskless asset paying interest
at ﬁxed rate or in a risky asset, whose price evolves randomly following a log-normal process. We
assume that the remaining lifetime of the pensioner is exponentially distributed with constant force
of mortality. The retiree can choose the proportion of the fund to be invested in the risky asset
and the withdrawal rate from the fund until the time of annuitization. She is also able to select
the time of eventual annuitization. The size of the annuity purchasable with sum x is kx, where
k > r. If the amount of money in the fund is ever exhausted, no further investment or withdrawal
is permitted, that means that occurrence of ruin is prevented by the model’s design.
We use this notation:
• y(t) is the proportion of the fund invested in the risky asset at time t;
• b(t)dt is the income withdrawn from the fund between time t and time t + dt.
• T is the time of annuitization;
• T0 is the time when the fund goes below 0;
• TD is the retiree’s time of death, as measured from the time when the lump sum is received;
• x(t) is the size of the fund at time t (where t < min(T,TD,T0)).
This model investigates the problem using y(·) and b(·) as control variables, and T as stopping
time. The proportion invested in the fund, the income withdrawn, and the annuitization time are















• Ex(·) = E(·|x(0) = x), i.e. the expectation value is conditioned to the current size of the
fund;
• τ = min(T,T0);
• v and w are positive weights which determine the relative importance in the cost criterion of
the payment before and after annuitization, respectively;
• ρ is a subjective discount factor;
• δ is the force of mortality which is assumed to be constant;
• b0 is the income target before purchasing the annuity;
• b1 is the amount that represents the targeted income after ultimate annuitization;
• k is the amount of annuity which can be purchased with one unit of money.










where r is the instantaneous rate of return from the riskless investment and λ is the instantaneous
rate of return from the risky investment with volatility σ. The standard Brownian motion B(·) is
the source of uncertainty that represents market risk.
The amount b0, the income target until the annuity is purchased, will in many cases be equal
to kx0, the size of the annuity which could have been purchased if the retiree had annuitized
immediately on retirement. The process x evolves until either it is advantageous to annuitize or
the fund falls to a negative value, in which case no further trading is permitted. The loss associated





(b1 − kx)2. (2)
The ratio b1
b0 is a measure of risk propensity: the higher b1
b0, the higher the target, the lower the risk
aversion and vice versa. Obviously the targeted annuity b1 is always assumed greater than income
withdrawn b0, hence b1
b0 > 1.
Should the fund hit b1
k , the pensioner would be able to buy a lifetime annuity with income rate b1
and the penalty from that moment on would be null, which is what we expect to be.
Clearly, if the fund is equal to b1
k the optimal decision is to annuitize. However, the main novelty of
the model is that optimal annuitization occurs also with a fund size x∗ that is lower than b1
k . The
intuition behind that is the following. When one reaches a certain level close enough to the desired
target, it is better to stop the self-annuitization strategy and accept the low penalty given by (2),
rather than keeping on investing and facing the risk of departing even more from the desired level.
5The region where it is optimal the self-annuitization strategy turns out to be







that in the optimal stopping theory terminology is called “continuation region”. The name of the
region U is intuitive: if the wealth x is in the continuation region, then the loss paid in case of
annuitization is higher than that paid in case of continuation of the optimization program, so that
it is optimal to keep playing the game; vice versa, if one’s wealth is outside that region, then the
loss paid in case of annuitization is lower than that paid playing the game, thus the game is over
and the pensioner annuitizes.
A complete solution of this optimal control model is given in [7]. For a complete analysis of the
mathematical model we refer to the original paper.
4 Sub-optimality of immediate annuitization
In this section, we prove the main theoretical result of this paper. In section 4.1, we state and prove
a theorem that gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which immediate annuitization is
optimal for every initial wealth x ∈ [0,b1/k]. In section 4.2 we illustrate the applicability of the
theorem and analyze the impact of diﬀerent key parameters on the criterion provided by the
theorem.
4.1 The criterion






Namely, for x0 < 0 the problem is not deﬁned; for x0 > b1
k the optimal policy is to keep playing the
game with consumption rate b = b0 up until the fund falls to b1
k . (2) What happens for the much





depends on the form of the continuation region (3) via the value
of the model’s parameters.
Theorem 1 In the model outlined in section 3, it is optimal to annuitize immediately at retirement










where D = b0
r − b1
k > 0, φ = ρ + δ + β2 − 2r + k2 w
v(ρ+δ), and β = λ−r
δ is the Sharpe ratio of the
risky asset.
Proof
(⇐) Denoting by T∗ the optimal annuitization time, by application of the Corollary 2.4 of [7], it is
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= w(b1 − kx)[2krD − φ(b1 − kx)].
(2)Indeed, with this simple strategy, the value function is identically null.














, then V (x) = K(x), where V is the value function associated to






This, in turn implies that given the set U0 deﬁned as

































4.2 Some intuition and interpretation behind the criterion
We believe that the practical implications of Theorem 1 are worth exploring. In fact, the meaning
of this theorem is the following.






. This means that compulsory immediate annuitization turns out to be optimal, in the
sense that retirees are obliged to behave optimally by the legislation.
If the criterion (4) is violated, then it is not true that for each initial fund x0 the optimal annuitiza-
tion time is T∗ = 0. This does not mean that T∗ = 0 is never optimal, for there are cases in which
φ > 2krD
b1 and x0 stays in the stopping region, leading to T∗ = 0.(3) Clearly, if (4) is not satisﬁed,
compulsory immediate annuitization is not optimal, for there are values of the initial wealth that
fall in the continuation region, for which it is optimal to take programmed withdrawals.(4)
For this reason, from now on we will associate the condition (4) to the optimality of a pension
system where immediate annuitization is compulsory. In other word, Theorem 1 can be stated
equivalently by saying that compulsory immediate annuitization is optimal if and only if (4) holds.
Thus, in a pension system where immediate full or partial annuitization is the only option, the lack
of ﬂexibility in choosing timing of annuitization can be shown to be sub-optimal by veriﬁcation of
the condition (4).
We can rewrite the condition (4) in several ways, in order to study the role and the impact of each
key factor on the criterion.








(4)This happens indeed for all x0 ∈ [0,x
∗).












Inequality (5) indicates that the value of the Sharpe ratio cannot be too high for having opti-
mality of compulsory immediate annuitization. This is intuitive, as the choice of programmed
withdrawals makes sense only in the hope of being better oﬀ than immediate annuitization.
This is possible only in the presence of a suﬃciently good risky asset. If the Sharpe ratio
is too small, then immediate annuitization should be preferred, as the beneﬁts of mortality
credits provided by the insurance products would enhance the return, making immediate an-
nuitization dominant with respect to investment in ﬁnancial market. This is the classic result
of [18], and has also been found in [5] and [15].
If we now consider the expression of k as given by k =
(r+δ)
(1+L), with L insurance loading factor,
and we set the simplifying and not unreasonable values ρ = r,L = 0 (notice that the former
is a typical assumption in this kind of literature, see e.g. [14]), we have
k = ρ + δ (6)
and we obtain the simple condition












from which we can gather useful information. Optimality of compulsory annuitization is not
possible if b1
b0 is too high. In particular, if the targeted pension income b1 is higher than twice
the annuity b0 purchasable at retirement, then the r.h.s. of (7) is negative, rendering the
inequality impossible to hold. The factor w
v also cannot be too high: considering that b0
b1 < 1
for the problem to make sense, if w
v ≥ 1, compulsory immediate annuitization can never be
optimal. Interestingly, from (7) we can also notice the marginality of the factor ρ + δ with
respect to b0
b1 and w
v whenever the term in squared brackets is negative: namely, in this case
optimality of compulsory annuitization can never occur, no matter what the value of ρ+δ is.
On the other hand, if the term in squared brackets is positive, then the value of ρ+δ can aﬀect
the validity of the criterion: in fact, a too low value of ρ+δ will make impossible the criterion
to hold, while a very high value of it can lead to optimality of compulsory annuitization.
This is consistent with intuition: ρ+δ is a measure of the intolerance towards future income
(this will be explained clearly in the next section). Thus, a very low value of ρ + δ, that is
associated to high tolerance for the future and high expectation of future remaining lifetime,
is likely to render immediate annuitization sub-optimal.







(ρ + δ + β2)(ρ + δ)
k2 . (8)
Inequality (8) says that in order to have optimality of compulsory immediate annuitization
the weight w given to loss in case of annuitization needs to be suﬃciently low with respect
to that given to loss for running consumption v, or, equivalently, the weight given to loss
in case of running consumption v needs to be suﬃciently high with respect to that given to
annuitization w.













Notice that, again, the risk aversion of the pensioner plays a role. As before, if the targeted
pension income b1 is higher than twice the annuity b0 purchasable at retirement, then the
r.h.s. of (9) is negative, rendering the above inequality impossible to hold. Again, also the
ﬁnancial market has an eﬀect: with too high values of the Sharpe ratio β, the r.h.s. can
become very small and even negative, and the same can happen with a too low value of ρ+δ.














Inequality (10) indicates that the ratio b0
b1 cannot be too low for compulsory immediate an-
nuitization to be optimal. This is equivalent to say that the targeted pension b1 cannot be
too high with respect to the pension b0 purchasable at retirement. This is again intuitive,
as immediate annuitization can turn out to be optimal only if the retiree is not too much
unsatisﬁed with it, and this can happen only if her desired income does not deviate too much
from the pension provided at retirement.

















Consistently with the analysis made before, we see that β and w
v cannot be too high and ρ+δ







then compulsory immediate annuitization cannot be optimal, given that b0
b1 < 1.
4. A simple condition on ρ + δ is not easy to interpret.(5) However, if we apply the simplifying













Expectedly, this implies that the factor ρ + δ has to be high enough to render possible
optimality of compulsory immediate annuitization. In addition, as commented in point 1
above, the value of ρ + δ has no impact whenever the other factors do not behave nicely. In
fact, if w
v and/or b1
b0 are too high, then compulsory immediate annuitization is not optimal no
matter what the value of ρ + δ is.





















9Remark 2 Notice that the occurrence of condition (4) is linked to the simultaneous occurrence of
the following:
• suﬃciently low value of β;
• suﬃciently low value of w
v ;
• suﬃciently low value of b1
b0;
• suﬃciently high value of ρ + δ.
Therefore, since these four key factors cannot be controlled – as some are linked to the ﬁnancial
market, some to mortality conditions, and some to personal preferences – it is evident that a pension
system that imposes compulsory immediate annuitization to the whole universe of retirees is bound to
be sub-optimal, according to this model. This simple conclusion evidently is not a great discovery.
Clearly, giving more ﬂexibility to the decision maker has the eﬀect of increasing her individual
utility, and this holds in every context. However, here we state that, even if immediate annuitization
might turn out to be optimal for the single retiree, it cannot be optimal for the universe of retirees
in its globality. More importantly, this model does provide what is the optimal annuitization time,
and therefore it enables us to quantify sub-optimality of compulsory immediate annuitization, by
simple computation of the cost of being sub-optimal. This is the topic of the next section.
5 Sub-optimality of compulsory immediate annuitization: practi-
cal implications
In this section, we illustrate the practical implications of Theorem 1. In section 5.1 we present four
typical scenarios which will be used in the simulations and, in each of them, check the violation of
criterion (4); in section 5.2 the cost of sub-optimality is deﬁned and measured in those scenarios.
5.1 Basic assumptions and scenario generation
We consider a male retiree aged 60 and time horizon equal to T = 30. In fact, accordingly to the
existing actuarial literature (see section 2), ages of optimal annuitization range typically between
70 and 80, and only rarely up to 85-90. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if the pensioner
has not annuitized at the age of 90, he will not do it later. His initial wealth is x0 = 100. The
riskfree asset in each scenario will be chosen at 3%. For the annuity calculation, we make use of an
Italian projected mortality tables (RG48). This set of assumptions corresponds to an immediate
annuity value equal to b0 = 6.22, and the conversion factor from lump sum in annuity is k = 0.085.
The parameters of the problem are
r, λ, σ, δ, k, v, w, b1, ρ. (11)
In a realistic setting r, λ, σ characterize the investment opportunities and depend on the ﬁnancial
market, δ depends on the demographic assumptions, and k depends on both the ﬁnancial and
demographic hypotheses.
Parameters that can be chosen are the weights given to penalty for running consumption, v, and
to penalty for ﬁnal annuitization, w, although it turns out that the relevant quantity is the ratio of
these weights, w
v . Another parameter chosen by the retiree is the targeted level of annuity, b1, while
10it is reasonable to assume that the level of interim consumption b0 is given and depends on the size
of the fund at retirement. A typical choice for b0 is the size of annuity purchasable at retirement
with the initial fund x0. Thus, typically b1 is multiple of b0, and the relevant quantity is b1
b0 > 1.
A parameter that is somehow arbitrary and somehow given is ρ, the intertemporal discount factor:
although subjective by its own nature, in typical situations cannot diﬀer too much from the riskfree
rate of return r and in all our simulations it will be assumed ρ = r. We notice that the discount
factor ρ is always associated to the mortality rate δ. This is intuitive: ρ + δ is the global discount
factor of the individual, that takes into account the subjective tolerance towards future income, ρ,
and the expected remaining lifetime, driven by δ. In this way the relevant quantity measuring the
patience of the retiree for future events, the value of time, is given by the sum ρ + δ.
In [7] the authors show that, expectedly, what really counts in the applications, are some relevant







, ρ + δ. (12)
This is indeed consistent with the fact that, as shown before, the validity of the criterion (4) only
depends on the value of these key quantities. This allows us in the following to ﬁx some of the
values (11) and change some others to get diﬀerent values of the relevant quantities (12). In fact,
similarly to the results found in the previous section, they ﬁnd that equal sign variations of the ﬁrst
three quantities and opposite sign variation of the fourth one produce equal qualitative variations
to some relevant features of the problem solution (not reported here because too technical and not




the width of the continuation region:
1. increases by increasing β;
2. increases by increasing w
v ;
3. increases by increasing b1
b0;
4. generally slightly decreases by increasing ρ + δ.
Indeed, it is reasonable to accept that a high Sharpe ratio can well be coupled with low risk aversion,
and also with high penalty in case of annuitization w.r.t. that paid in case of running consumption.
Moreover, it is natural to expect that a low ρ+δ is consistent with a high w
v , because these choices
are both led by high tolerance toward future income. And vice versa. Notice ﬁnally that these
relationships between the key parameters and the width of the continuation region are consistent
with the analysis made in section 4.2. In fact, we have commented above that T∗ = 0 for every
initial wealth, meaning x∗/(b1
k ) = 0, is possible only with low enough values of β, w
v and b1
b0 and
with high enough value of ρ + δ.
In a ﬁrst set of simulations, here not reported, we let all the relevant quantities vary accordingly
to the description. We have found out that the result do not diﬀer very much when the ratio w
v
increases. For this reason, we have ﬁnally ﬁxed the ratio w
v equal to 1. Results have turned out to
be more sensible to the choice of ρ+δ that, as mentioned, measures the weight given to future and
present ﬂows, i.e. the time value of money for the retiree.
We ﬁx four diﬀerent scenarios, by starting with low values of the ﬁrst two relevant quantities and
high value of the third one, and then progressively augmenting the ﬁrst two of them and reducing
11the third one, at the same time. The values of the relevant quantities of the four scenarios, which
we call A, B, C, and D, are reported in Table 1.(6)
A B C D
β 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.50
b1
b0 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25
ρ + δ 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03
Table 1: Value of key parameters in scenarios A, B, C, D.
Although, clearly, the set of combinations of diﬀerent values of the relevant ratios is potentially
unlimited, and the model can be run with diﬀerent combinations, here we focus on these four
scenarios, which we ﬁnd representative for four diﬀerent kinds of individuals:
• Scenario A would be suitable for individuals quite risk averse, who desire a pension target
only 50% higher than b0. They do not expose themselves too much to ﬁnancial risk, and gain
a small value of β on the market. These individuals strongly prefer current income to future
income, probably due to a high estimate of the subjective mortality rate.
• Scenario B reports preferences for individuals moderately risk averse, who target a ﬁnal
pension 75% higher than b0. They ﬁnd a β = 0.33 on the market, and give more weight to
the present rather than the future.
• Scenario C would be suitable for individuals with low risk aversion, who aim to double their
ﬁnal annuity via programmed withdrawals. They are able to gain β = 40% on the ﬁnancial
market and give approximately the same importance to future and present income, taking
into account also the mortality rate.
• Scenario D would be suitable to risk lovers, who aim to more than double the immediate
annuity b0, and get a very high value of β on the market. They put substantial weight to
future income, compared to present one, either due to low estimate of their own mortality
rate or due to strict preference for the future.
Straight application of the deﬁnitions allows us to check that, as expected, in the four scenarios
chosen the criterion (4) is not satisﬁed.
In each of the four scenarios, we have also tried to see if it was possible to obtain the validity of the
criterion (4) just by changing one parameter out of the four relevant ones (that are β2, w
v , b1
b0,ρ+δ),
leaving the other three ﬁxed. This turns out to be impossible: in all cases the value of the key
parameter that allows optimality of compulsory immediate annuitization is not admissible. In
particular, in each of the four scenarios selected,
(6)In particular, the values of the full set of parameters is the following:
Scenario A: r = 0.03, λ = 0.06, σ = 0.12, δ = 0.06, k = 0.085, w = 1, v = 1, ρ = 0.03, b0 = 6.22, b1 = 9.33.
Scenario B: r = 0.03, λ = 0.08, σ = 0.15, δ = 0.04, k = 0.085, w = 1, v = 1, ρ = 0.03, b0 = 6.22, b1 = 10.80.
Scenario C: r = 0.03, λ = 0.102, σ = 0.18, δ = 0.02, k = 0.085, w = 1, v = 1, ρ = 0.03, b0 = 6.22, b1 = 12.44.
Scenario D: r = 0.03, λ = 0.13, σ = 0.20, δ = 0.005, k = 0.085, w = 1, v = 1, ρ = 0.03, b0 = 6.22, b1 = 14.00.
12• the value of β2 such that φ = 2krD
b1 (leaving unchanged the value of the other three key
parameters) is negative,
• the value of ρ + δ such that φ = 2krD
b1 (leaving unchanged the value of the other three key
parameters) is negative,
• the value of w
v such that φ = 2krD
b1 (leaving unchanged the value of the other three key
parameters)) is negative,
• the value of b1
b0 such that φ = 2krD
b1 (leaving unchanged the value of the other three key
parameters) is lower than 1.
This is further evidence of the fact observed in Remark 2 that if the preferences and needs of
pensioners can be represented by the model exploited, then a system where immediate annuitization
is compulsory and programmed withdrawals are not an option is bound to be sub-optimal.
The next section is devoted to measuring the extent of sub-optimality for the single individual in
the four scenarios selected previously.
5.2 Sub-optimality of immediate annuitization: cost of sub-optimality
In this section, we deﬁne two measures – one absolute and one in relative terms – for the cost
of sub-optimality of immediate annuitization in terms of loss of expected present value (EPV )
of consumption stream from retirement up to death. In particular, we calculate the EPV of
consumption in the two cases of optimal annuitization (EPVOA) and immediate annuitization
(EPVIA) and make the diﬀerence(7). Henceforth, we will call the diﬀerence EPVOA −EPVIA cost
of sub-optimality, or sub-optimality cost (SC). In other words:
SC = EPVOA − EPVIA = sub-optimality cost.
To give a better idea of the improvement that can be achieved in case of optimal annuitization, we
introduce a new quantity, called relative sub-optimality cost (RSC). This is deﬁned as the ratio




= relative sub-optimality cost.
This quantity indicates by how much in percentage the pensioner can increase his reward (measured
in terms of EPV of consumption) by adopting programmed withdrawals with respect to immediate
annuitization.
In order to have an idea of the extent of the cost of sub-optimality in real applications, we perform
numerical simulations for each scenario selected in section 5.1. For each scenario, we run 1000
Monte Carlo simulations for the risky asset. Across the four scenarios, we have ﬁxed the 1000
trajectories of the Brownian motion.
It is important to underline that in order to calculate the sub-optimality cost, we focus only on
those trajectories for which optimal annuitization has actually occurred between retirement and
the time-horizon of 30 years. The trajectories where the optimal fund fails to reach the boundary
of the continuation region x∗ within the time-frame of 30 years have been assigned a 0 value to
the SC, because the model does not require a ﬁnite time-horizon and, more importantly, because
(7)By expected present value of a future stream we mean the actuarial value at retirement of the future stream.
13optimal annuitization at a later age would produce diﬀerent results in terms of SC. Assignment
of SC = 0 to all trajectories where optimal annuitization does not occur is the explanation for a
bar around 0 in the histograms. However, in the statistics of SC (Table 2) we will not consider the
zeroes and will present the statistics only for the relevant cases in which T∗ < 30.
In each scenario and for each trajectory, the EPV of consumption stream has been calculated
according to actuarial principles with the interest rate r for the ﬁnancial basis, and with the
mortality table RG48 for the demographic basis. For the immediate annuitization option the ﬂow
to be discounted is equal to b0 at any time from retirement up until age 110. For the optimal
annuitization case, the ﬂow to be discounted is equal to the optimal consumption from retirement
until age of optimal annuitization T∗, to the actual pension rate achieved from that time up to age
110.
Figures (1a), (1b), (1c), and (1d) report the histograms of the distribution of SC in scenarios A,
B, C and D, respectively.

























COST OF SUBOPTIMALITY GIVEN T* ≤ 30
(a) Scenario A.

























COST OF SUBOPTIMALITY GIVEN T* ≤ 30
(b) Scenario B.

























COST OF SUBOPTIMALITY GIVEN T* ≤ 30
(c) Scenario C.

























COST OF SUBOPTIMALITY GIVEN T* ≤ 30
(d) Scenario D.
Figure 1: The sub-optimality cost deriving from scenarios A, B, C and D, respectively.
Table 2 is made by two parts. In what follows, by Prob(E) we mean the frequency over the 1000
simulations of the event E.
141. The ﬁrst part reports for each scenario the probability that optimal annuitization does not
occur in the time-frame of 30 years, the probability that the sub-optimality cost SC is positive,
the mean of the relative sub-optimality cost RSC, the mean of the optimal annuitization
time T∗, and the mean of the ﬁnal annuity A∗ received upon annuitization at time T∗ (more
detailed statistics of T∗ and A∗ are provided by the next section).
2. The second part reports for each scenario some statistics of the sub-optimality cost.
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D
Prob(T∗ > 30) 6.30% 25.30% 34.10% 50.90%
Prob(SC > 0) 93.60% 73.50% 65.00% 49.00%
Mean RSC 6.62% 28.91% 38.80% 38.82%
Mean T∗ 1.0312 8.1532 14.1807 19.6263
Mean A∗ 6.8397 11.6771 18.0114 26.8969
Mean SC 338.9556 1,479.9263 1,985.7943 1,987.0308
Standard deviation SC 134.4206 378.5419 700.8871 935.0963
Minimum SC -514.0536 -726.6107 -499.4168 -16.5548
Maximum SC 938.7281 1,988.1095 2,697.1238 3,340.5489
5th percentile SC 214.8806 603.5453 352.3035 301.9541
25th percentile SC 248.7041 1,451.6475 1,724.5226 1,254.0524
50th percentile SC 303.6802 1,568.8207 2,350.9992 2,200.6371
75th percentile SC 383.6738 1,675.8389 2,458.8257 2,841.1091
95th percentile SC 642.5026 1,789.9402 2,561.7912 3,183.1867
Table 2: Statistics of the cost of sub-optimality and of all relevant quantities deriving from all
scenarios.
Figures (1a), (1b), (1c), (1d), and Table 2 allow a broad comparison among all scenarios regarding
all types of quantities analyzed throughout the paper. Let us recall that the scenarios A, B, C and
D are descriptive of diﬀerent risk aversion attitudes, with the A scenario representing the highest
and the D scenario reporting the lowest. We can gather the following information:
• considering that the sum of the number of cases in which optimal annuitization does not
occur and number of cases characterized by SC > 0 (sum of the ﬁrst two lines of Table 2) is
almost approximately 99%, for each scenario we ﬁnd that in all but 10 cases in which optimal
annuitization occurs, the sub-optimality cost is positive, meaning that the pensioner is better
oﬀ when programmed withdrawals are adopted;
• the few cases when optimal annuitization does occur but SC < 0 are motivated by the fact
that the dynamic programming approach minimizes the expected loss (or maximizes expected
utility) and fails to capture very rare unfavorable scenarios (e.g. extreme events);
• the extent of improvement with optimal annuitization (or the extent of loss with immediate
annuitization) is measured by the mean RSC, in the third line of the table: it amounts to
only 7% for scenario A, to 29% for scenario B, 39% for scenarios C and D. As expected, the
margin of improvement increases when risk aversion of the individual decreases;
15• the probability of unsuccessful use of this model, meaning absence of annuitization within 30
years from retirement, also increases when decreasing the risk aversion;
• the optimal annuitization time increases when decreasing the risk aversion;
• the size of annuity achieved upon optimal annuitization also increases on average when de-
creasing the risk aversion.
6 The optimal annuitization time: performance analysis
In order to make the analysis more complete, in this section we provide more detailed information
gathered from the simulations, about the optimal annuitization time T∗ and the ﬁnal annuity size
A∗ achieved at time T∗.
In particular, for each scenario we provide the following (here, again, by Prob(E) we mean the
frequency over the 1000 simulations of the event E):
• the histogram with the distribution of the optimal annuitization time T∗, measured in years
from retirement;
• the histogram with the distribution of the ﬁnal annuity A∗ achieved upon optimal annu-
itization; the ﬁnal annuity A∗ has been calculated each time through the actuarial fairness
principle, using the RG48 mortality table and the interest rate r = 0.03; each time, the actual
age of annuitization has been used, consistently with what would happen in the practice;
• statistics of the optimal annuitization time T∗ and of the size of annuity A∗ upon optimal
annuitization, with consequent comparison with that achievable on immediate annuitization
(Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6); note that the mean of T∗ and of A∗ are already reported in Table 2;
• some relevant information relative to extreme cases such as:
– probability of optimal annuitization within one year from retirement, Prob(T∗ < 1),
– probability of optimal annuitization after the time-frame considered, Prob(T∗ > 30),
– probability that the ﬁnal annuity A∗ is lower or equal than b1, Prob(A∗ ≤ b1);
– probability of negative optimal consumption, Prob(b∗ < 0), and average time of negative
consumption, given that there is negative consumption (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6).
Summarizing, Figures (2b), (2a) and Table 3 report results relative to scenario A; Figures (3b), (3a)
and Table 4 those relative to scenario B; Figures (4b), (4a) and Table 5 those relative to scenario
C; Figures (5b), (5a) and Table 6 those relative to scenario D.
Remark 3 The statistics of optimal annuitization time and ﬁnal annuity reported in Tables 3, 4,
5, and 6 are conditional on T∗ ≤ 30. When optimal annuitization does not occur within the 30-
years time-frame, T∗ is set equal to 0, but its statistics is not reported into the mentioned Tables,
and the same for the statistics of the ﬁnal annuity. In a similar way, in Figures (a) and (b) of
each scenario, that report the histograms of distribution of T∗ and ﬁnal annuity A∗, the cases when
optimal annuitization does not occur have not been reported.
Remark 4 Scenarios B, C and D are characterized by the same scale in all Figures, whereas
scenario A diﬀers from the others relatively to Figures (2a) and (2b). This is due to the much
higher concentration of values around the mode of the distribution in scenario A than in the other
scenarios.
166.0.1 Scenario A





















(a) Optimal annuitization time.























Figure 2: Scenario A.
Mean T∗ 1.0312
Standard deviation T∗ 2.8087
Mean A∗ 6.8397
Standard deviation A∗ 1.2638
Prob(T∗ < 1) 77.00%
Prob(T∗ > 30) 6.30%
Prob(A∗ ≥ b1) 2.24%
Prob(b∗ < 0) 2.40%
Mean time of b∗ < 0 (given b∗ < 0) 4.40 yrs
Table 3: Statistics of the optimal annuitization time, statistics of the size of annuity, and relevant
information on extreme cases in scenario A.
From Figures (2a), (2b) and from Table 3, we can gather the following information:
• the most striking feature that can be observed is the timing of optimal annuitization T∗: in
most of the cases, T∗ occurs only 1-2 years after retirement. In particular, in 770 cases out
of 1000 optimal annuitization occurs within one year from retirement;
• in 63 cases out of 1000 optimal annuitization does not occur within the time-frame of 30 years
after retirement;
• the size of ﬁnal annuity A∗ upon optimal annuitization is always higher than the pension
achievable on immediate annuitization b0; however, the improvement does not seem to be
particularly signiﬁcant, since in 75% of the cases the ﬁnal annuity A∗ lies between 6.48 and
6.71, vs b0 = 6.22. This is due to the fact that annuitization occurs too early and the price
of annuity at that age is still too high, compared to the value of k chosen, and this results
into a low pension rate;
17• in 98% of the cases the annuity value turns out to be lower than b1. On the contrary, in
very few cases (2.24%) the annuity value turns out to be higher than b1 = 9.33: this is due
to annuitization occurring 20-25 years after retirement, when the old age of the pensioner
pushes downwards the price of the annuity, leading to a high annuity value to be purchased
with the wealth available at T∗;
• optimal negative consumption occurs in 24 cases out of 1000, and on average consumption
remains negative for 4 years.
6.0.2 Scenario B























(a) Optimal annuitization time.





















Figure 3: Scenario B.
Mean T∗ 8.1532
Standard deviation T∗ 7.2171
Mean A∗ 11.6771
Standard deviation A∗ 5.9555
Prob(T∗ < 1) 2.20%
Prob(T∗ > 30) 25.30%
Prob(A∗ ≥ b1) 29.58%
Prob(b∗ < 0) 5.30%
Mean time of b∗ < 0 (given b∗ < 0) 2.84 yrs
Table 4: Statistics of the optimal annuitization time, statistics of size of annuity, and relevant
information on extreme cases in scenario B.
From Figures (3a), (3b) and from Table 4 we can gather the following information:
• the timing of optimal annuitization, T∗ is much more spread out than in scenario A: on
average, T∗ occurs 8 years after retirement, and in 50% of the cases it occurs after 5 years. In
18only 22 cases out of 1000 optimal annuitization occurs within one year from retirement and
in 25% of the cases it occurs at a date later than 11 years after retirement;
• in 253 cases out of 1000 optimal annuitization does not occur within the time-frame of 30
years after retirement;
• the size of ﬁnal annuity A∗ upon optimal annuitization is always higher than the pension
achievable on immediate annuitization b0; this time, the improvement is more signiﬁcant
than in scenario A, since in 75% of the cases the ﬁnal annuity A∗ lies between 7.88 and 11.77,
vs b0 = 6.22. This is due to the fact that now optimal annuitization occurs at a later age
than in scenario A and the price of annuity at that age is suﬃciently low to guarantee a mode
than adequate improvement in the pension rate;
• in 30% of the cases the annuity value turns out to be higher than b1 = 10.89: as before, this
is due to annuitization occurring 15-25 years after retirement, when the relatively old age of
the pensioner pushes downwards the price of the annuity, leading to a high annuity value to
be purchased with the wealth available at T∗;
• optimal negative consumption occurs in 53 cases out of 1000, and on average consumption
remains negative for 2.8 years.
6.0.3 Scenario C























(a) Optimal annuitization time.





















Figure 4: Scenario C.
19Mean T∗ 14.1807
Standard deviation T∗ 7.3754
Mean A∗ 18.0114
Standard deviation A∗ 28.8639
Prob(T∗ < 1) 0.00%
Prob(T∗ > 30) 34.10%
Prob(A∗ ≥ b1) 63.13%
Prob(b∗ < 0) 3.20%
Mean time of b∗ < 0 (given b∗ < 0) 2.01 yrs
Table 5: Statistics of the optimal annuitization time, statistics of the size of annuity, and relevant
information on extreme cases in scenario C
From Figures (4a), (4b) and from Table 5 we can gather the following information:
• the distribution of optimal annuitization, T∗, has more or less the same dispersion than in
scenario B, but the mean is much higher: on average T∗ occurs 14 years after retirement, and
in 50% of the cases it occurs after 13 years. Optimal annuitization never occurs within one
year from retirement and the minimum T∗ is equal to 2 years. In 25% of the cases it occurs
at a date later than 20 years after retirement;
• in 341 cases out of 1000 optimal annuitization does not occur within the time-frame of 30
years after retirement; this too high percentage of individuals not annuitizing before age 90
is the price to be paid when the target aimed is chosen to be very high;
• the size of ﬁnal annuity A∗ upon optimal annuitization is always signiﬁcantly higher than
the pension achievable on immediate annuitization b0; the improvement with respect to b0
is now remarkable: in 75% of the cases the ﬁnal annuity A∗ lies between 9.62 and 20.88, vs
b0 = 6.22. This is eﬀect of the two combined facts that x∗ is much higher than before and
that optimal annuitization occurs at a much later age, with consequent very low price of the
annuity;
• in 63% of the cases the annuity value turns out to be higher than b1 = 12.44: as before, this
is due to annuitization occurring 15-25 years after retirement, when the relatively old age of
the pensioner pushes downwards the price of the annuity, leading to a high annuity value to
be purchased with the wealth available at T∗;
• optimal negative consumption occurs in 32 cases out of 1000, and on average consumption
remains negative for 2 years.
206.0.4 Scenario D























(a) Optimal annuitization time.





















Figure 5: Scenario D.
Mean T∗ 19.6263
Standard deviation T∗ 6.1493
Mean A∗ 26.8969
Standard deviation A∗ 10.9322
Prob(T∗ < 1) 0.00%
Prob(T∗ > 30) 50.09%
Prob(A∗ ≥ b1) 93.48%
Prob(b∗ < 0) 1.10%
Mean time of b∗ < 0 (given b∗ < 0) 2.05 yrs
Table 6: Statistics of the optimal annuitization time, statistics of the size of annuity, and relevant
information on extreme cases in scenario D.
From Figures (5a), (5b) and from Table 6 we can gather the following information:
• the most striking feature is the probability that optimal annuitization does not occur in the
30 years time-frame: indeed, it is as high as 50.09%. We believe that with such a high
probability of failure to annuitizing in a reasonable time horizon, this model should not be
used.
• when T∗ < 30, it occurs on average after 19 years from retirement, with a moderately high
dispersion; in 70% of the cases it occurs between 10 and 25 years from retirement. Moreover,
optimal annuitization never occurs within 5 years from retirement. In 25% of the cases it
occurs at a date later than 25 years after retirement;
21• the size of ﬁnal annuity A∗ upon optimal annuitization is dramatically higher than the pension
achievable on immediate annuitization b0: in case of optimal annuitization the minimum
pension rate achieved is 11.94, that is almost the double than b0 = 6.22, and the size of
annuity between the ﬁfth and the seventy-ﬁfth percentiles ranges between 14 and 33, while
in 25% of the cases it ranges between 33 and 50. This is mainly due to the too high selected
b1, that leads to an extremely high value of the boundary of the continuation region x∗: in
the most favorable scenarios, when the wealth reaches x∗, the annuity size is extremely high;
• the results on the size of annuity are conﬁrmed also by the fact that in 93% of the cases the
annuity value turns out to be higher than b1 = 14;
• optimal negative consumption occurs in 11 cases out of 1000, and on average consumption
remains negative for 2 years.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the position of a retiree member of a DC pension scheme and
have investigated the optimal annuitization time by application of the model introduced by [7]. In
particular, we have focused on the appropriateness of immediate annuitization, that is compulsory
in many countries where the option of programmed withdrawals is not available.
In a ﬁrst part of the paper, we have assessed a necessary and suﬃcient condition for compulsory
immediate annuitization to be optimal. We have found that the validity of this condition depends
on some key factors, that are linked to the ﬁnancial market (via the Sharpe ratio of the risky
asset) to the demographic conditions (via the force of mortality of the retiree) and to individual
preferences (via the risk aversion of the individual and the diﬀerent weights given to consumption
pre- and post-annuitization). In particular, we have found that the Sharpe ratio, the risk aversion
and the weight given to loss for consumption post-annuitization, relative to that pre-annuitization,
have to be suﬃciently low in order to have sub-optimality of compulsory immediate annuitization.
On the contrary, the intolerance towards future income as well as the force of mortality have to
be suﬃciently high for the condition to be satisﬁed. These are intuitive results. As a consequence,
we have found that, since these key factors cannot be controlled a priori, a pension system that
imposes compulsory immediate annuitization is bound to be sub-optimal.
In a second part of the paper, we have measured the extent of sub-optimality, in terms of loss of
expected present value of consumption. We have deﬁned the sub-optimality cost both in absolute
and in relative terms as the diﬀerence between EPV of consumption from retirement to death
in the case of optimal annuitization and in the case of immediate annuitization. We have run
extensive simulations to ﬁnd the sub-optimality cost in diﬀerent representative scenarios. With a
very few exceptions, the cost of sub-optimality turns out to be positive in all cases in which optimal
annuitization occurs in the time-frame of 30 years from retirement considered. Quite remarkably,
in relative terms the sub-optimality cost varies from 6% with high risk aversion up to 20 − 30%
with medium risk aversion, and can be as high as 40% with low risk aversion. This clearly indicates
by how much a pensioner gives up part of her future wealth when she annuitizes immediately, with
respect to undertaking programmed withdrawals followed by optimal annuitization.
Finally, in order to complete the analysis, from the simulations we have collected and provided useful
information regarding other relevant issues, like optimal annuitization time and size of annuity
upon optimal annuitization. We have found the intuitive result that the optimal annuitization
time decreases with the risk aversion. In particular, we ﬁnd that it should occur on average 1-2
22years after retirement when risk aversion of the retiree is very high, 8-9 years after retirement with
medium risk aversion, 14-15 years after retirement when risk aversion is very low and should occur
after 20 years or may not happen at all if the individual is strongly risk lover. Finally, we ﬁnd the
quite obvious result that the size of ﬁnal annuity upon optimal annuitization is always higher than
that obtainable on immediate annuitization. Expectedly, the size of annuity on average increases
when the optimal annuitization time increases: in other words, it is seemingly worth to wait in
order to obtain a higher reward.
We think that the main contribution of this paper are twofold. The ﬁrst novelty is the proof of
sub-optimality of a pension system where immediate annuitization is mandatory. The second and
most important novelty is the precise quantiﬁcation of the degree of sub-optimality of immediate
annuitization. To this aim, the sub-optimality cost reports the loss in expected present value of
consumption suﬀered by a pensioner who has to accept immediate annuitization, rather than taking
phased withdrawals. The striking ﬁgures of the sub-optimality cost in relative terms clearly indicate
the suitability of programmed withdrawals for retirees of DC pension schemes. One of the main
concerns of each legislator should be the welfare of its pensioners, and this is obviously strictly
linked to the aﬀordability of a proper consumption stream. Therefore, the ambitious aim behind
the evidence provided by this paper would be to suggest appropriate adjustment to the legislation
of those countries where programmed withdrawals are not available: we believe that to some extent
this option should be oﬀered to retirees, so as increase ﬂexibility in choosing a proper timing of
beneﬁts after retirement, and – not least – allow optimal choices for pensioners.
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